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Abstract - The Versatile and Ubiquitous Secret Sharing System, a cloud data repository secure access and a web based 
authentication scheme. It is designed to implement the sharing, distribution and reconstruction of sensitive secret data 
that could compromise the functioning of an organisation, if leaked to unauthorised persons. This is carried out in a 
secure web environment, globally. It is a threshold secret sharing scheme, designed to extend the human trust security 
perimeter. The system could be adapted to serve as a cloud data repository and secure data communication scheme. A 
secret sharing scheme is a method by which a dealer distributes shares of a secret data to trustees, such that only 
authorised subsets of the trustees can reconstruct the secret. This paper gives a brief summary of the layout and functions 
of a 15-page secure server-based website prototype; the main focus of a PhD research effort titled ‘Cryptography and 
Computer Communications Security: Extending the Human Security Perimeter through a Web of Trust’. The prototype, 
which has been successfully tested, has globalised the distribution and reconstruction processes. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Adeka’s Versatile and Ubiquitous Secret Sharing System (AdeVersUS3), a cloud data repository secure access, is a 
web based authentication scheme. It is designed to implement the sharing, distribution and reconstruction of a 
sensitive secret data; e.g., a combination key for firing a nuclear missile, the access code for a flow station, the 
Coca-Cola formula or any highly sensitive data that could compromise the functioning of an organisation, if leaked 
to unauthorised persons. This is carried out in a secure web environment, globally. It is a threshold secret sharing 
scheme, designed to extend the human trust security perimeter. Though primarily designed as a secret-sharing 
system, it could be adapted to serve as a cloud data repository and secure data communication scheme. A secret 
sharing scheme is a method by which a dealer (appointed by an organisation) distributes pieces (shares) of a secret 
data to a group of people (trustees, participants or players), such that only authorised subsets of the trustees can 
reconstruct the secret. Secret sharing schemes are important tools in cryptography which are used as a building 
block in many secure protocols; e.g., general protocol for multiparty computation, Byzantine agreement, threshold 
cryptography, access control and attribute-based encryption. This paper gives a brief summary of the layout and 
functions of a 15-page secure server website prototype; the main focus of a PhD research effort titled ‘Cryptography 
and Computer Communications Security: Extending the Human Security Perimeter through a Web of Trust’ [1]. 
The paper will briefly highlight the theoretical basis for secret sharing, a summary of design and implementation 
of AdeVersUS
3
 prototype, the practical results, discussions and conclusions with recommendations for future work. 
 
II   THEORETICAL BASIS FOR SECRET SHARING 
In cryptography, secret sharing is a method by which a given secret is distributed among a set of participants 
(trustees), each of whom is given only a share of the secret. Reconstruction of the secret would only be possible 
when all the participants or a stringently defined minimum subset of participants (access structure or authorised set) 
pool their shares together. In other words, both individual shares and any number of shares less than the authorised 
set are of no use on their own. Thus, generally, the access structure of a (k, n)-threshold scheme normally partitions 
the set of all subsets of participants into authorised sets who can recover the secret and unauthorised sets who 
cannot; some schemes feature an intermediate third class of subsets, who are neither authorised nor unauthorized 
[2]. The aim of the scheme is to provide tight control over the sensitive data and remove single-point vulnerability. 
0 
The objective of a secret sharing scheme is to make a given secret D (say some data, e.g., key combination) 
inaccessible to unauthorized persons, while making it accessible to authorized persons when the need arises. It is 
assumed that non-mechanical solutions which could manipulate this data in the process are allowed [3]. The goal is 
to divide D into n pieces Di,…,Dn such that: 
 
 Knowledge of any k or more Di pieces makes D easily reconstruct-able. 
 Knowledge of any k-1 or fewer Di pieces leaves D completely indeterminable (in the sense that all its 
possible values are equally likely; assumed absolute randomness). 
A Key Recovery via Threshold Schemes 
Threshold schemes are often referred to as secret sharing or secret splitting. A secret (such as a session key or 
private/public key pair) is split into several shares, a subset of which must be combined to recover the secret. For 
instance, a secret might be split into 6 (n) shares and any 3 (k) might be needed to recover it.  The value k in the 
above scheme is called the threshold number, while n is the share size. Any reasonable share size and recovery 
threshold is possible (provided the threshold number is less than or equal to the share count). In order that the secret 
data or key be recoverable, it must be an RSA private key [4]. The RSA cryptographic algorithm consists of three 
main steps; namely, key generation, encryption and decryption. While the public key can be known to everyone and 
is used for encrypting messages, all messages encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with the use of 
the private key, which  is kept secret and known only to its owner, the originator.  RSA derives its security from the 
difficulty of factoring large prime numbers. Its public and private keys are functions of a pair of large prime 
numbers (100 to 200 digits or larger). A decryption of the ciphertext using the private key is perceived as being 
equivalent to factoring the product of the two large prime numbers [5]. 
B Mathematical Definition 
The main idea behind Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme (SSSS) is based on polynomial interpolation. [3] The 
polynomials could be replaced by any other functions which are easy to evaluate and to interpolate. This idea is 
rooted in the notion that two points are enough to define a line, three points are required to define a quadratic 
expression, four points are required to define a cubic function and so on. In other words, it requires ‘k’ points to 
define a polynomial of order ‘k-1’ [6]. 
Given k points in the Cartesian plane (x1, y1),...,(xk, yk) with distinct xi's, there is one and only one polynomial 
g(x) of order k-1such that g(xi) = yi for all i. Without losing generality, it can be assumed that the data D is a number 
or it could be made a number. In order to divide it into pieces Di, pick a random k-1degree polynomial 
 
 g(x)= a0 +a1x+...ak-1x
k-l
 . . . . . . (2) 
 
where   a0 = D. Then evaluate: 
 
D1 = g(1), ... , Di=g(i), ... ,Dn=g(n). 
 
 
Using any subset of k of the Di values, the coefficients of g(x) can be found by interpolation, and then evaluate D = 
g(0). Knowledge of just k-1 of these values, on the other hand, is not enough to calculate D. In order to make this 
claim more precise, [3] uses modular arithmetic {i.e., finite field arithmetic or arithmetic in the Galois Field 
[GF(p)]} instead of real arithmetic; the set of integers modulo a prime number p forms a field within which 
interpolation can be carried out. 
 Example 
 
In a threshold scheme, a secret data (a prime number) is shared among 5 trustees.  The key can be recovered by 
using any 2 shares.  Show that the secret can be recovered from any 2 of the following shares and hence determine 
the secret data. (Consider the use of graphical observation/interpolation; hence, start by plotting the points to solve 
the problem). 
 
S1 = (-3  ,  13), S2 = (-1   ,  9), S3 = (2   ,  3),  
S4 = (4   , -1),  S5 = (6  ,  -5). 
 
Plotting the points (Si ) as given will produce the graph in Figure 1. It is clear that any two points are sufficient to 
reproduce the line since all of the points above lie on it.  Thus, the secret data, represented by the point at which the 
graph intersects the y-axis, is clearly 7. 
 
  
 
Fig. 1. Determining the Secret Data for a Straight Line Graph. 
 
 
 
Mathematically, the above result can be verified as follows. Using the general formula for a line: 
 
 
y = mx + c, where m is the gradient = (change in y)/(change in x) between two points 
 
Take two points on the line e.g. (4, -1) and (6, -5) 
 
The gradient m is   ( -5  –  (-1) ) / ( 6 – 4 )  =  - 4/2 = -2. 
 
Using the point (4, -1) and substituting m = -2 into the above equation gives: 
 
-1 = -2(4) + c 
 
Therefore, 
 
c = 7 (same as determined graphically above). 
 
III   PROTOTYPE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
A Web Design Requirements 
The design envisaged the engineering and development of a website whose web pages would display a real-
time digital clock (showing the GMT or UTC timing), and the site would require at least more than one form of 
authentication for access, for security reasons. It would also display a timer (down counter). 
Supposing that a secret item (e.g., a password) is shared among five participants who are scattered around the 
world; say one each in Russia, China, Nigeria, USA, UK and Australia, and each of them has only a fraction or 
share of the Secret, which, on its own, is grossly insufficient to determine the secret. It is required that at least three 
or more fractions of the password domiciled in any three or more of the above identified countries around the world 
must be assembled in order to reconstruct the whole password. Inherent in these requirements are the authentication 
needs, each, to determine the identity of each participant, his/her geographical location and the authenticity of 
his/her share or fraction of the Secret to be reconstructed. 
In the event that the password in use by the rightful owner or authority is missing or gets destroyed, some of the 
participants with fractions of it would be required to recombine or reconstruct it from their different locations 
around the world without coming together geographically. Each of them would be required to enter his/her own 
fraction of the password on the website within a specified short period of time (say 5 minutes; e.g., between 1420 
and 1425 hours GMT of a given date) so that the entire password would be reconstructed at a designated GPS 
location, as may be directed or determined by the Dealer (coordinator or administrator). After reconstruction, only 
the designated/authorised participant (s) should be able to access the data; this accessibility should be possible once 
only. 
B Web Design Implementation 
The AdeVersUS
3
 prototype utilises Shamir’s Secret Sharing Scheme (SSSS), MD5 encryption and user 
registration methods to securely create and share data through a web browser in a Wi-Fi configuration; or using 
local host in a wired LAN. The system is built up using HTML5, PHP, Java, Servlets, JSP, MySQL, JQuery, and 
CSS. These are running on Tomcat and Apache data bases using XAMPP Server. There are various libraries used 
such as the Database Connector, Joda Time, Google’s JSON parser and Shamir’s Algorithm. The source code is 
object oriented and adheres to software engineering tools and principles. In order to run the server via the local host: 
start up the Tomcat server (Java) in Eclipse, Apache (PHP) and MySQL (database). Point the browser to 
http://localhost:8080/secretshare/ (NB: secretshare is the project file name which could be changed any time). Each 
user (participant) must be registered to access the system. When the user registers, the password and GPS 
coordinates could be encrypted using MD5. The user must also give his GSM contact information at the time of 
registration 
The prototype website contains about 15 web pages. These include the Admin, Login, Secure Share, and Secret 
Data web pages. Apart from issues relating to connectivity and database, some of the prototype functions are also 
represented in the Use Case Diagram, Sequence Diagram and State Diagram. The basic flow of the prototype 
functional states is shown in the state diagram in Figure 2. The web development followed the design steps for the 
Waterfall model. 
 
 
 
 
  
Fig. 2. AdeVersUS3 Prototype State Diagram 
 
 
 
IV   PRACTICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
This segment highlights how the AdeVersUS
3
 prototype actually functions and the novelties or areas of new 
knowledge that it has been able to accomplish in the science of secret sharing till date. The discussion ends with a 
basic comparison of the Prototype system and the SSSS, using security and time as metric parameters. The net 
diagram of the real AdeVersUS
3
 prototype is in Figure 3. 
A Admin Page 
The Admin web page can only be viewed by the user on the server side within the local host; any external 
connections are denied. This page must be fully configured before a share distribution session can commence. For 
instance, if the start time on the Admin page has not been set, then the user cannot login. When the Admin sets the 
start time and the time duration is specified, the end time which is automatically calculated from these is also 
displayed. The default format for HTML5 date-picker is used for the date and user display time. All the values can 
be set as in Figure 4; this illustrates a threshold quorum of three out of five shares. It is also on this page that the 
sharing process can be restarted to begin another session, after a successful recovery of a secret data in the previous 
session, or to repeat the previous session in the event of a failure. Point 3 allows the user who is authorised to view 
the data to be selected. Point 8 allows the keys to be assigned to specific users; in a given situation where users are 
not serially assigned according to the database serialisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Adeka’s Global Secret Sharing Scheme Employing a Secure 
Server at the School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 
Faculty of Engineering and Informatics, University of Bradford, United 
Kingdom, with a Client each at Los Angeles, USA; Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil; Abuja, Nigeria; Canberra, Australia; Beijing, China; and  
Moscow, Russia. 
 Fig. 4. Part of Page 1 of Admin Page. 
Page 2 of the Admin web page (Master Share Details) displays part of the results of the settings configured in Figure 
4; this is to assist while testing the prototype. Once the form in Figure 4 is submitted, the system sends the 
information to Shamir’s Secret Sharing Algorithm. This encrypts the data and returns a number of keys based on the 
setting above. The system uses HTTP GET request to use SSSS API. The system uses the GSON library to parse the 
data into a DTOSecret object. A sample JSON is:  
{“timeStart”:”1368221578”,”secretKeys”:[“0101596f75”],”numberOfShares”:”1”,”quorum”:”1”}.  
As part of the user data displayed on Page 2 of the Admin Page as determined by the setting in Figure 4, this is a 
sample response from the SSSS algorithm, where it has split the secret data into a single key; as set in the Admin. 
After this stage, all the data needed for a session is set and the system is ready to handle users and share secret data. 
B Login Page 
The opening web page (home page) on the client side allows the user to log in and register; he registers only for 
the first time, which could be edited afterwards, if he wishes. Here the user input is entered through the hashed 
keypad. Once the login has been submitted, using a POST request through HTTP, it gets passed through the MD5 
function and compared with the MD5 value stored in the database. In order to prevent an SQL Injection Attack, the 
system uses prepared statements [7]. In logging in, for example, security verification checks are carried out to 
prevent security breaches: e.g., does the entered name exist and does the md5 password match? A ‘Yes’ leads to the 
opening of the next web page; the Secure Share page. The Login page uses a hashed map key pad as shown in 
Figure 5, where JQuery is used to get the key pad values and input them into the text box when the text field is 
clicked.  
 
 
 
C Secure Share Pages 
The Secure Share Page is where the users log into to add their keys, GPS data and mobile authentication code. 
Similar verification checks are again carried out, using MD5 hashes and other data in the database, as done in the 
login page, to ensure that the data added meet the criteria. That is, does the GPS match; has the correct user entered 
the correct key assigned to him; and does the verification code sent to the user match? The page also makes 
provision for editing of personal data, if the user wishes to do so. Part of the Secure Share web page is shown in 
Figure 6. The result of a successfully authenticated entry by a user into a share/reconstruction session for all users, 
except the authorised user, is shown in Figure 7; that of the authorised user is as in Figure 8. The prototype system 
generates a Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) and sends it to the mobile number registered by the user for 
additional authentication purposes. The SMS message contains the pass code for the data share. This is implemented 
using a built-in java UUID generator. The Secure Share page has a countdown clock, which expires based on the 
share duration set in the Admin page. Once all the shares (or the required threshold) have been added, the data can 
be unlocked. The authorised user gets to see a page with a countdown and a button to reveal the secret data. Once 
the authorised user clicks the View Data Button (which appears only on his own screen), various checks are carried 
out; to ensure that each user has added the key and code assigned to him correctly, his GPS data is correct, the 
quorum (threshold) has been met and if within the time limit; i.e., the countdown clock is still counting as at the time 
the last user successfully enters his data. Finally, the keys are sent back into the SSSS algorithm for final check.  
D Secret Data Viewing Page 
If all went well without any error, a successful sharing process would display the Secret Data page when the 
authorised user clicks the View Data Button; otherwise, an appropriate error message is displayed on the page. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Part of Page 1 of Login Page: Login Form. 
 Fig. 6. Secure Share Page 
If the display shows success, the system is restarted, ready for the next share session; if it shows a message that 
indicates failure, the system is restarted, ready to repeat the failed session. The authorised user can view the 
reconstructed secret data once only. The system gets wiped out as soon 
 
Fig. 7. Response for a Successful Entry by a User (Participant). 
 
Fig. 8. Response for a Successful Entry by the Authorised User. 
as the secret data has been unlocked and displayed. Any page refreshment or re-attempt will result in an error 
message. A sample result of this page is shown in Figure 9.  
 
 
Fig. 9. Secret Data Page Displaying Success 
 
E Connectivity 
The system currently runs on a laptop via local host within a typical home router, using Wi-Fi. Remote access 
to this system can be achieved by setting up port forwarding on the router. This is required because the IP address in 
the 
 
the server will have an internal IP address: 192.168.x.x (which can be viewed in the command prompt by typing 
ipconfig). This IP needs to be registered in the router settings for port forwarding. Once this is set, the router will 
forward any requests on port 8080 (port could be different) to the local host on 192.168.x.x:8080/secretshare/ - 
which is the login page.  The next stage is to find the external IP address of the local router, which can be obtained 
via a simple Google search. Then any remote users can point their browsers to <router-ip-
address>:8080/secretshare/ and start using the sharing system. The server can also be remotely accessed through a 
wired LAN with an appropriate switch. The prototype has been successfully demonstrated using both techniques. 
Using port forwarding as described above, the server can be accessed from anywhere in the world. 
 
F Areas of New Knowledge 
The main novelties that have been accomplished so far relate to modifications, in form of additions, in the SSSS 
algorithm, in an effort to resolve some of the identified weaknesses in the (k, n)- threshold schemes. These include: 
The geographical spread of trustees which is now global in nature as against a one-location based recombination 
process; Due to its globalisation, location-based user authentication techniques are introduced – e.g., employment of 
the GPS coordinates and SMS text mobile authentication codes; the inclusion of a dynamic time window, digital 
clock and timer; other long-standing unresolved issues in relation to secret sharing, which have now been resolved 
in the AdeVersUS
3
 include answers to the questions - Who is the Combiner,  Where should the recombination take 
place and Who is entitled to have access to the reconstructed secret? It is also noteworthy that the practical 
implementation of a web based authenticated secret sharing scheme, with all the complements of the AdeVersUS
3
, 
has no precedence. 
G Comparing AdeVersUS
3
 with the SSSS 
It would not be fair to make any reasonable claims of its performance characteristics in comparison with the 
SSSS algorithm, as some analo-synthesists (analysts
+
 and synthesists
-
) might be erroneously tempted to do. This is 
because, while the SSSS is an algorithm for breaking up a secret data into pieces and reconstructing same, 
AdeVersUS
3
 prototype is a pragmatic service, which practically implements the secret sharing and reconstruction 
scheme globally; using the Shamir’s algorithm as a cryptographic primitive, along with various other building 
blocks and incorporated modern authentication techniques. Comparing the SSSS algorithm with AdeVersUS
3
 
prototype secure server is akin to a comparison between the vacuum tube diode/semi-conductor transistor and a 
radio transceiver system. 
V CONCLUSION 
AdeVersUS
3
 employs various building blocks, including the SSSS algorithm, MD5 and various libraries. Its 
programing elements include HTML5, PHP, Java, Servlets, JSP, MySQL, JQuery, and CSS. These are running on 
Tomcat and Apache data bases using XAMPP Server within the Eclipse IDE. The prototype system does work and 
the data can be shared across the globe via a secure server based website. It has passed JUnit tests, but has not been 
tested under heavy traffic. The phone number is registered during the registration process but the user is allowed to 
edit it along with other existing user details; these are potential areas of security concern subject to modifications. 
Hacking into the system to illegally access the data would be a very tough task. There are many checks to ensure 
that every condition has been met before the data is unlocked. SMS-text-verification-based authentication gives an 
added level of security and a modern touch. The same is true of GPS coordinates. The prototype achieved some 
novelties as enumerated in Section IV (F). 
Further work would focus on the following: having a managed area to set up future shares at a given period; 
having more than one different share sessions happening simultaneously; capturing all the user interactions in a 
database; other incorporations aimed at making the system more robust and versatile; and subjecting the system to 
various performance tests. In addition, instead of splitting the secret data itself as keys to be shared among 
participants, it might be better to share randomly generated keys which are then used to protect the secret data. This 
would be a more secure approach in the event that the on-going efforts at homomorphic encryption become a reality.  
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